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[L. A. No. 21945.
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EVA SIMPSON et al., Appellants, v. 'r:HE CITY OF LOS
ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents; MEDICAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATION (a Corporation)
et al., Interveners and Respondents.
[1] Municipal Corporations-Remedies of Taxpayers-Injunction

[2]

[3]

[ 4]

[5]

[6]

Against Illegal Expenditures.-Resident taxpayers of a city
are entitled to sue to prevent alleged illegal expenditures of
municipal funds in enforcing an ordinance relating to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals for purpose of medical
research. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a.)
Elections-Duty of Court to Validate Elections.-Courts are
reluctant to defeat the fair expression of popular will in
elections and will not do so unless required by the plain
mandate of the law.
Municipal Corporations-Municipal Elections.-Where printed
arguments mailed to voters with respect to a proposed municipal ordinance were prepared pursuant to provisions of the
city charter that the clerk shall prescribe the form of printing and the character of paper to be used, and there is no
allegation that the city clerk acted improperly or that he
was aware of instructions assertedly given to opponents of the
measure by the assistant city attorney that any printed arguments which the opponents desired to have mailed to the
voters with the sample ballot must be on newsprint of a specified size and that no rotogravure would be allowed, and where,
moreover, such attorney had no authority to bind the city
by giving these instructions, such matters do not constitute
grounds for invalidating adoption of the measure.
Evidence-Judicial Notice-:-Municipal Ordinances.-The Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice of city ordinances.
Pleading-Ordinances.-A complaint involving the validity of
a city ordinance does not sufficiently plead the ordinance
where it does not quote the language of the section in question or state its effect, nor give the title or date of passage.
Animals-Dogs-Licenses and Police Regulations.-The licensing, impounding and disposition of dogs are not exclusively
municipal affairs, and if there is any conflict between an

McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations, § 478; [2]
Elections, § 70; [3] Municipal Corporations, § 265; [ 4] Evidence,
q8; [5] Pleading, § 16; [6, 13-17] Animals, §55; [7] Municipal
Corporations, § 237; [8-10, 12, 18-22] Animals, § 3; [11] Animals,
§52.
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ordinance relating to such matters and the state law, the
latter will prevail. ( Const., art. XI, § 11.)
[7] Municipal Corporation-Ordinances-Conflict With Statutes.
-A city under its police power may enact local measures
which do not conflict with general statutes. ( Const., art.
XI, § 11.)
[8] Animals-Licenses and Police Regulations.-Agr. Code, §§ 391403, regulating the seizure and disposition of cstrayed stock
and domestic animals generally, do not operate to invalidate
a city ordinance relating to surrender of unclaimed impounded
animals for purpose of medical research.
[9] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-There is no inconsistency between a city ordinance relating to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals for purpose of medical research
and a general law which relates to the running at large of
dogs and protection of livestock and provides for the licensing, impounding and disposition of dogs. (1 Deering's Gen.
Laws, Act. 384; Stats. 1921, p. 1306, as amended.)
[10] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-Pen. Code, §§ 597,
599b, 599c, which define and prohibit cruelty to animals, do
not occupy the same field as a city ordinance relating to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals for purpose of medical research, and such ordinance prevails where there is
nothing therein which conflicts with the code provisions.
[11] !d.-Cruelty to Animals.-Purpose of Pen. Code, § 599c, declaring that nothing in the code sections relating to cruelty
to animals shall be construed as "interfering . . . with properly conducted scientific experiments or investigations performed under the authority of the faculty of a regularly incorporated medical college or university of this state," is to
limit the effect of the provisions prohibiting cruelty to animals rather than to regulate the disposition of impounded
animals.
[12] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-While research institutions other than medical colleges or universities may receive animals for experimental purposes under a city ordinance relating to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals
for purpose of medical research, this does not conflict with
the Penal Code prohibitions of cruel or improper experiments where the ordinance specifically provides that the hospitals or research institutions which receive dogs must have
been certified as organizations which will use them "humanely
. . . for the good of mankind and the increase of knowledge
relating to the cause, prevention, control and cure of disease."
[7] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations,§ 224; Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 165.
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[13] !d.-Dogs-Licenses and Police Regulations.-The licensing
of dogs and the regulation of the manner in which they shall
be kept and controlled are within the legitimate sphere of
the police power, and statutes and regulations may provide
for impounding dogs and for their destruction or other disposition.
[14] Id. -Dogs- Licenses and Police Regulations.- When dogs
have been lawfully impounded under the police power and
have become subject to disposition under the terms of a city
ordinance relating to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals for purpose of medical research, private property rights
in such dogs must, in the interests of public welfare, be treated
as having been terminated.
[15] Id.- Dogs- Licenses and Police Regulations.- Where one
subsection of a city ordinance provides that no animal shall
be surrendered for medical research until it has been impounded for at least five days, and another subsection provides that the owner, if known, must be notified in every
case a dog is impounded, regardless of the proposed method
of disposing of the animal, and the city must act to give
such notiee within one day after the dog is impounded, the
first subsection contemplates and requires compliance with
the notice provisions of the other subsection and, when considered together, the subsections require that the city must
act to give notice to the owner, if known, within one day
after a dog is impounded and the owner must have at least
five days after receipt of such notice in which to reclaim the
animal.
[16] Id.- Dogs- Licenses and Police Regulations.- Where a
city ordinance requiring the city to give notice to the owner,
if known, within one day after a dog is impounded does not
specify the method by which the owner shall be notified of
the impounding, the owner is entitled to actual notice.
[17] Id. -Dogs- Licenses and Police Regulations.- Provision
of city ordinance requiring dogs to wear a numbered tag at
all times when at large on the streets is a reasonable requirement, and an owner can insure his getting notice of impounding of a dog in all but exceptional cases by complying
with the ordinance.
[18] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-A city ordinance relating to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals for purpose of medical research does not deprive owners of their
property without a hearing, where provisions of the ordinance
that an owner may redeem an impounded animal on payment

[13] See Cal.Jur.2d, Animals, § 24; Am.Jur., Animals, § 31 et
seq.
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of certain fees and that any animal unlawfully taken up or
impounded shall be immediately delivered on demand therefor
to the owner or person entitled to its custody contemplate a
factual or mixed factual and legal determination shall be
made by the department collecting the fees, and hence must
be interpreted to provide for a hearing, when requested by
the owner, on the question of whether a dog has been legally
seized.
[19] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-The surrender of impounded, unclaimed animals to private research laboratories
and institutions, as provided by a city ordinance, is not a
gift of public property within the meaning of Const., art. IV,
§§ 22, 31, since the animals are to be used for a public purpose.
[20] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-Where unclaimed impounded animals may, under the terms of a city ordinance, be
turned over only to such institutions as will use them "for
the good of mankind and the increase of knowledge relating
to the cause, prevention, control and cure of disease," and
Health & Saf. Code, § 1650, expressly recognizes that "public health and welfare depend on the humane use of animals"
for medical research, the fact that private laboratories may
derive some incidental benefit from the use of the animals
is immaterial.
[21] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-A city ordinance relating to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals for purpose of medical research is not unconstitutional on the ground
that the city health officer is invested with uncontrolled arbitrary discretion to determine which institutions are qualified
to receive such animals, where the ordinance describes the
kinds of institutions which may apply for unclaimed animals
and provides that the health officer is to certify any reputable
organization on being satisfied that the animals will be used
humanely for the specified purpose, since this constitutes a
sufficient standard for the guidance of the city health officer.
[22] !d.-Licenses and Police Regulations.-A city ordinance relating to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals for purpose of medical research is not special legislation which discriminates in favor of some institutions and denies equal
protection to others because the city health officer is empowered to certify only certain types of institutions and only
those located within the city, where the classification of permissible organizations is designed properly for the general
health and welfare of the public, and it is not unreasonable
to confine his investigations to organizations which are within
the city limits in view of the requirement that he may certify
only those institutions which he is satisfled will use the animals
for the designated purpose.
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----------·----------APPBAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. ClarE'nec JVI. Hanson, .Judge. Affirmed.
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Action to restrain enforcement of a city ordinance relating
to surrender of unclaimed impounded animals for purpose
of medical research. ,Judgment for defendants affirmed.
Brooks Gifford and Moni::; T.1avine for Appellants.
Hay L. Chesebro, City Attorney, William H. Neal and
Bourke Jones, Assistant City Attorneys, and Alan G. Campbell, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents.
Musick & Burrell, Howard Burrell, James E. Bednar,
Stephens, Jones & La Fever, Raymond W. Stephens, McGinley & Hanson and John P. McGinley for Interveners and Hespondents.
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiffs seek to restrain defendant city
and two officials from carrying into effect subsection (h) of
section 53.11 of a Los Angeles city ordinance* which provides,
*The ordinance is known as the Los Angeles Municipal Code. Subsection (h) provides: "Whenever any reputable institutions of learning, hospitals, research laboratories or their allied institutes in the
City of Los Angeles shall make application to the Health Officer of
the City of Los Angeles for permission to use humanely unclaimed impounded animals for the good of mankind and the increase of knowledge relating to the cause, prevention, control and cure of disease, the
Health Officer, on being satisfied that the said animals are to be so
used, shall, from time to time, certify to the Department of Animal
Regulation the names and addresses of said institutions of learning,
hospitals, research laboratories and their allied institutes which he is
satisfied will use animals humanely for the purposes above specified.
"It shall be the duty of the Department of Animal Regulation to
surrender unclaimed impounded animals for such uses only when applied for by the institutions of learning, hospitals, research laboratories and their allied institutes which have been certified by the
Health Officer as herein provided. No animal shall be surrendered
except as authorized by law.
''In order to give the owners of impounded animals time within
which to reclaim the same, no animal shall be surrendered for such
uses until it has been impounded for a period of at least five days.
''No animal shall be surrendered for medical research, the owner
of which has turned over such animal to the Department of Animal
Regulation for destruction. Any such request for destruction of an
animal by the owner thereof shall be complied with by the Department.
''The Department of Animal Regulation shall adopt and enforce
rules and regulations providing for the care of animals so surrendered
comparable to Supplement 211 Public Health Reports, 1949, Federal
Security Agency, entitled, 'Care of the Dog Used in Medical Research.' ''
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in part, that the Department of Animal Regulation shall
surrender unclaimed animals which have been impounded for
five days to reputable institutions of learning, hospitals and
laboratories that have been certified by the city health officer
as organizations which will use animals humanely for the
good of mankind in medical research. General demurrers
were sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiffs failed to
amend, and judgment was thereafter entered in favor of defendants.
The complaint alleges that three of the plaintiffs are resident taxpayers who own dogs licensed by the city, that the
fourth plaintiff resides in adjacent unincorporated territory
and owns a dog licensed by the county, that these dogs have
recently become estrays without fault on the part of their
respective owners and that plaintiffs have made due and diligent inquiry but have been unable to locate their pets. There
is no allegation as to what happened to the dogs, but it is
alleged that they are subject to seizure and impounding by
the Department of Animal Regulation and that defendants
threaten to enforce subsection (h) of section 53.11 and to
surrender unclaimed impounded dogs for medical research. It
is contended that this portion of the ordinance is invalid because of asserted irregularities in connection with the election at which it was adopted, that it conflicts with state law,
that its enforcement will deprive plaintiffs of their dogs without due process of law and constitute an unlawful taking of
private property, and that it provides for a gift of public
property. It is also asserted that the ordinance improperly
vests uncontrolled discretion in the health officer and permits him to discriminate arbitrarily between research institutions and that it is invalid as special legislation because
it grants privileges to a limited class of institutions.
[1] A preliminary question has been raised as to plaintiffs' right to bring the action, but it is sufficient to note
that the complaint alleges that three of the plaintiffs are resident citizens and taxpayers of the city and that enforcement
of' the ordinance will result in unlawful expenditures of
municipal funds. As such taxpayers, they are entitled to
sue to prevent the alleged illegal expenditures. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 526a; Clouse v. City of San Diego, 159 Cal. 434,
438 [114 P. 573]; Wirin v. IIorrall, 85 Cal.App.2d 497, 504505 [193 P.2d 470]; see Crowe v. Boyle, 184 Cal. 117, 152
[193 P. 111]; Yarnell v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. 603, 610
[25 P. 767].)

Feb. 1953]

SIMPSON

v.

CITY OF

Los

ANGELES

277

[40 C.2d 271; 253 P.2d 464]

In support of their claim that subsection (h) was not legally
adopted, plaintiffs allege that the opponents of the measure
followed instructions from an assistant city attorney that any
printed arguments which the opponents desired to have
mailed to the voters with the sample ballots must be on newsprint of a specified size and that no rotogravure would be
allowed. Plaintiffs complain that the city clerk permitted
proponents of the measure to use leaflets of a larger size
which were processed by rotogravure on slick paper, and
that as a result a substantial number of voters cast their
votes in favor of the measure because of the more attractive
appearance of proponents' arguments. [2] Courts are reluctant to defeat the fair expression of popular will in elections and will not do so unless required by the plain mandate of the law. (See Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 12
Cal.2d 412, 426-427 [84 P.2d 1934] ; In re East Bay etc.
Water Bonds of 1925, 196 Cal. 725, 744 [239 P. 38] ; Rideout
v. City of Los Angeles, 185 Cal. 426, 430 [197 P. 74] .)
[3] It is asserted by defendants, and not disputed by plaintiffs, that the arguments were prepared pursuant to sections
275 and 289 of the r~os Angeles City Charter, which provide that the clerk shall prescribe the form of printing and
the character of paper to be used. There is no allegation
in the complaint that the city clerk acted improperly or
that he was aware of the instructions assertedly given to
the opponents of the measure by the assistant city attorney.
Moreover, it does not appear that the assistant city attorney
had any authority to bind the city by giving such instructions.
It follows that the matters complained of do not constitute
grounds for invalidating the adoption of the measure.
Plaintiffs also allege that the argument of the proponents
which was mailed to the voters failed to conform with the
provisions of section 343 of the Election Code of the City
of Los Angeles. The complaint, however, does not quote the
language of the srction or state its effect. nor does it give
the title or date of passage. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 459.)
[4] \Ve cannot take judieialnotice of city ordinances. (See
C1:ty of Oakland v. Brock, 8 Ca1.2d 639, 641 [67 P.2d 344] .)
[5] Under the circumstances the pleading is insufficient.
(City of 1'ulm·e v. Hevrcn. 126 Cal. 226, 229-231 r58 P. 530].)
The next question is whether the portion of the ordinance
under attack is invalid because of asserted conflicts with
state laws. [6] In our opinion, the licensing, impounding
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and disposition of dogs is not exclusively a municipal affair,
and, therefore, if there is any eonflict between the ordinance
and the state law, the latter will prevail. ( Const., art. XI,
§ ] 1; see Eastlick v. C1:ty of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.2d 661, 666
[177 P.2d 558, 170 A.L.R. 225]; In re Portnoy, 21 Cal.2d
237, 239-240 [131 P.2d 1] ; Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366,
370-371 [125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515] .) [7] The city,
however, under its police power, may enact local measures
which do not conflict with general statutes. ( Const., art. XI,
§ 11.)
[8] Sections 391 to 403 of the Agricultural Code do not
operate to invalidate the ordinance. The code sections regulate the seizure and disposition of estrayed stock and domestic
animals generally, and it is expressly provided that nothing
therein shall affect municipal regulations regarding estrays.
(Agr. Code, § 400.) [9] Similarly there is no inconsistency
between subsection (h) and another general law which relates to the running at large of dogs and the protection of
livestock and provides for the licensing, impounding and
disposition of dogs. ( 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 384; Stats.
1921, p. 1306, as amended.) Subsection (h) will, of course,
be read as applying only to dogs which have been lawfully
impounded, and the statute expressly recognizes the power
of local bodies to provide for ''the killing in some humane
manner or other disposition of" lawfully impounded dogs.
(1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 384, §§ 6, 7.5.)
[10] Sections 597, 599b and 599c of the Penal Code which
define and prohibit cruelty to animals are applicable generally throughout the state, but they do not occupy the field
in which the ordinance operates, and there is nothing therein
''"hich eonflicts with their provisions. [11] Seetion 599c of
the Penal Code provides that nothing in the sections relating to cruelty to animals shall be construed as ''interfering
. . . with properly condueted seientific experiments or investigations performed under the authority of the faculty
of a regularly incorporated medical college or university of
this state.'' lt thns appears that thr basie purpose of section
599c is to limit the effeet of the provisions prohibiting eruelty
to animals rather than to regulate the disposition of impounded animals. The section does not purport to designate
all the institutions which may receive such animals for experimental purposes or to forbid experimentation by other
than those it names, and it cannot reasonably be said that
the Legislature intended to indicate that proper and humane
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experiments can be eonducted only under the authority of
the faculty of a regularly incorporated medical college or
university. [12] While it is true that, under the ordinance, research institutions other than medical colleges or
universities may receive animals for experimental purposes,
this obviously does not conflict with the Penal Code prohibition of cruel or improper experiments. Instead, as we
have seen, it is specifically provided that the hospitals or
research institutions which receive dogs must have been
certified as organizations which will use them "humanely
. . . for the good of mankind and the increase of knowledge
relating to the cause, prevention, control and cure of disease.''
Our conclusion in this connection is strengthened by sections
1650 to 1677 of the Health and Safety Code, enacted in 1951,
which provide for state regulation of the use of animals for
medical research. Sections 1651 and 1667 permit such use
by any "person . . . laboratory, firm, association, corporation, copartnership, and educational institution," upon compliance with certain rules, and section 1670 expressly provides that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit
or restrict the right of cities to adopt or enforce ordinances
regulating the use or procurement of animals for medical
research.
We come next to plaintiffs' contention that enforcement of
the ordinance will deprive them of their property without due
process of law. [13] It is well settled that the licensing
of dogs and the regulation of the manner in which they shall
be kept and controlled are within the legitimate sphere of
the police power, and that statutes and ordinances may provide for impounding dogs and for their destruction or other
(lisposition. (Hofer v. Carson, 102 Ore. 545 [203 P. 323, 326];
see In re Ackerman, 6 Cal.App. 5, 13-14, 16-17 [91 P. 429];
Sentell v. New Orleans & C. Rnilroad Co. [1897], 166 U.S. 698
[17 S.Ct. 693, 695-696, 41 hEel. 1169]; 8 A.L.R. 67, 74-76; 2
Am.Jur. 719, 721, 799.) The complaint does not attack the
right of the city to provide for the impounding of stray dogs
or for the disposition of impounded dogs by such methods as
are covered by other portions of section 53.11 of the ordinance,
namely sale, destruction, or gift to the armed forces, but plaintiffs assert that the surrender of animals for medical research
pursuant to the ordinance amounts to an unlawful taking of
private property. [14] It is clear, however, that when dogs
have been lawfully impounded under the police power and
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have become t:mbject to disposition under the terms of the
ordinanee by any of the means noted above, private property
rights in such dogs must, in the interest of public welfare, be
treated as having been terminated.
[15] Plaintiffs also contend that subsection (h) is invalid
because it does not contain any provision for notice to the
owner of an impounded dog. 'l'his subsection provides that
"no animal shall be surrendered [for medical research] except as authorized by law'' and that ''in order to give the
owners of impounded animals time within which to reclaim
the same, no animal shall be surrendered for such uses until
it has been impounded for a period of at least five days.''
Under subsection (b)* the owner, if known, must be notified
in every case where a dog is impounded, regardless of the
proposed method of disposing of the animal, and the city must
act to give such notice within one day after the dog is impounded. rrhe provision of subsection (h) that no animal
shall be surrendered except as authorized by law clearly contemplates and requires compliance with all other applicable
subdivisions, including the notice provisions of subsection (b).
The courts, whenever possible, adopt that interpretation of a
statute which will render it constitutional, and, therefore, the
subsections should be read together for the purpose of avoiding
any question of invalidity arising from the Jack of a specific
notice requirement in subsection (h).
·when considered together the subsections require that the
city must act to give notice to the owner, if known, within
one day after a dog is impounded and that the owner must
have at least five days after receipt of such notice in which
to reclaim the animal. [16] Subsection (b) does not specify
the method by which the owner shall be notified of the impounding, and since there is nothing elsewhere in the ordinance to indicate that any particular form of notice is contemplated, the owner, under the authorities, is entitled to
actual notice. (See Colyear v. ToMiner, 7 Cal.2d 735, 743
l62 P.2d 741, 109 A.L.R 191]; Johnson v. Barreiro, 59 Cal.
App.2d 213, 218 [138 P.2d 746]; cf. Stockton Automobile Co.
*Subsection (b) provides: "In the case of dogs, the Department of
Animal Regulation shall hold such animal for a period of one (1) day
after the impounding of such animal, during which time the owner
of said animal, if known, shall be notified, after which time said animal may be sold by an officer of the Department in the same manner
as provided in" this Section for tlie sale of other animals except that
notice of sale need be posted for only two (2) days in the places named
in this section.' '
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v. Confer, 154 Cal. 402, 408 r97 P. 881] ; Long v. Chronicle
Pub. Co., 68 Cal.App. 171, 179 [228 P. 873]; Alphonzo E.
Bell Corp. v. Listle, 55 Cal.App.2d 300, 306 [130 P.2d 251] .)
'Ne nred not speculate as to the possible methods by which
actual notice may be given to a known owner, since we may
assume that the city will proceed in a manner sufficient to
meet all requirements of law. The provision of :mbsection (h) that, "in order to give the owners . . . time within which to reclaim tfw same,'' no animal shall be surrendered
for me(1ical research until it has been impounded for "at
lt>ast five days'' was obvionsly intended to afford an owner
ample opportunity to reclaim his animal, and in our opinion
the subsections should be construed as providing that the five
(lay period does not begin to run against a known owner
nntil he has received actnal notice of the impounding. So
construed, the ordinanee affords adequate notiee to an owner
whose identity is known.
[17] If a dog is wearing a license tag as required by section 53.15 et seq. of the ordinance, the name and address
of its owner will be available to the Department of Animal
Regulation so that notice may be given. By prescribing a
system of licenses and requiring dogs to wear a numbered tag
at all times when at large on the streets, the city has done
all it can to make sure that it will know the owner's identity.
The tag requirement is reasonable, and an owner ean insure
his getting notice in all but exceptional cases by complying
with the ordinanee. If a dog is not wearing a lieense tag when
impounded, its owner will not have any ground to complain
of a failure to receive notice, because the ordinance places
upon him the duty to make sure that the rlog wears its lieense
tag at all times except when it is indoors or in an enclosed
yard or pen. (Ordinance, § 53.21.) In view of the foregoing
it is mmeeessary for us to consider whether an ordinance of
this type would br~ inyalid if it did not eontain a provision for
noti('e. (See 8ndr77 Y. Xew OrlNms (\- 0. Railroad Co. [1R!"l7l.
166 F.S. 698, 704-706 rn S.Ct. 60~1. 68:1-606. 41 TJ.Ed. 1169];
and cases cited in 8 A.hR. 67, 74-76.)
[18] There is no merit to plaintiffs' contention that the
ordinaner~ deprives them of their property without a hearing.
Section 53.13 provides that an owner may redeem an impounded animal upon payment of certain fees and charges,
anrl sertion 53.12. whieh sets forth the charg-es to be collected
by the Department of Animal Regulation, states that "No
fees whatsoever shall be charged or collected for or on account
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of any animal which has been unlawfully taken up or impounded, and any such animal shall be immediately delivered
upon demand therefor to the owner or person entitled to the
custody thereof.'' The ordinance thus contemplates that a
factual or mixed factual and legal determination shall be
made by the department, and under these circumstances it
must be interpreted to provide for a hearing, when requested
by the owner, upon the question of whether a dog has been
ll"gall.v seized. ( Cf. FasC?:nation, Inc. v. Iloover, 39 Cal.2d
260, 268-211 [246 P.2d 656].) If, on the other hand, the owner
of a dog concedes the legality of the impounding and fails to
redeem the dog or to exercise his right under the subsection
to demand that the dog be destroyed rather than turned over
for medical research, there is no further need for a hearing.
[19] The surrender of impounded, unclaimed animals to
private research laboratories and institutions is not a gift of
public property within the meaning of sections 22 and 31 of
article IV of the California Constitution, since the animals
arc to be used for a public purpose. ( Cf. Califo1·nia Emp.
Stab. Com.. v. Payne, 31 Cal.2d 210, 216 [187 P.2d 702] ;
County of Los Angeles v. La F1wnte, 20 Cal.2d 870, 877 [129
P.2d 3781 ; County of Alameda v. Janssen, 16 Cal.2d 276.
281-282 [106 P.2d 11, 130 A.L.R. 1141].) [20] Under the
terms of the ordinance animals may be turned over only to
snch institutions as will usc them ''for the good of mankind
and the increase of knowledge relating to the cause, prevention, control and cure of disease,'' and the Health and Safety
Code expressly recognizes that "public health and welfare
depend on the humane use of animals'' for medical research.
(Health & Saf. Cocle, § 1650.) Under these circumstances the
fact that private laboratories may derive some incidental
benefit from the nse of the animals is immaterial. (California
J!Jmp. Stab. Corn. v. Payne, sup1·a, 31 Cal.2d 210, 216; Countu
of Alamecla v. Janssen, snpra, 16 Cal. 276, 281.)
[21] Another ground of asserted unconstitutionality is
that the city health officer is invested with uncontrolled arbitrary discretion to determine which institutions are qualified
to receive impounded animals for purposes of medical research.
As we have seen. howr~ver, the ordinance describes the kinds
of institutions which may apply for unclaimed animals and
provides that the health officer is to certify any reputable
organization on being satisfied that the animals will be used
humanely for the specified purposes. In our opinion this constitutes a sufficient standard for the guidance of the city hea.lth
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officer. Ji is ohYionsJy llllllt'<oPRfiary for 1fw ordina,n(•p (O (kfinP what eonstiintPs a n•pntahle institntion or a hnmane u:;;e
of animal~-1, HlHl in virw of the 111nnher and var·iety of medical experiments in vohing the 11se of animals and the rapid

ehanges in medical seience this appears to be a situation in
which the broad type of standard set forth in the ordinance is
appropriate. ( Cf. Carm:netti v. Pacific Mtct. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.
:2c1 344, 364 [l:iD P.2cl
; Bnttenvorth v. Boyd, 12 Cal.2d
140, 148-149 [82 P.2d 434, 1:26 A.L.R 838]; GayTm·d v. City
of Pas<Idena, J73 Cal. 4;)8, 4i39-440 [166 P. 848].)
[22] 'l'he final objeetion is that subsection (h) is special
legislation vvhich disc1·iminates in favor of some institutions
and denies eq nal protection to others because the city health
officer is empcnverecl to certify only certain types of institutions and ouly those located within the city of Los Angeles.
Hrm-ever, tl1e organizations which the health officer is authorized to certify are reputable institutions of learning, hospitals and laboratories whieh will use animals humanely in
medical researeh for the good of mankind. 'l'his classification
is dcsig·ned properly for the promotion of the general health
and welfare of the public. Nor is there anything improper in
l't•strictiug the institutions which may receive animals to those
which are located within the city of Los Angeles. Since the
eity health officer may certify only those institutions which he
is satisfied will use animals for the designated purpose, it is
not unreasonable to confine his investigations to organization!'\
which are within the city limits.
'l'he judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., 'l'raynor, .T., Spence, ,T., and Van Dyke, ,J. pro
tem., concurred.
CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree with the construction placed by the majority on the sections of the ordinanee in question or that the
notice provisions contained in those sections are sufficient
to afford due proeess of law. Subsection (b) of seetion 53.11
provides that an owner must be notified within one day after
a dog is impounded and that the animal may be sold thereafter if notice of sale is posted for two days; under subsection
(h) it is provided that no dog may be st~rrendM·ed to a cert·ified institution for experimental purposes unless it has been
impounded for at least five days. The majority of this court
indulges in some legerdemain in the field of judicial legisla-
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tion and <'omes np wit'n ih<' startling n~sult that these two
sPetiom; mm;t hr read togdlwr: that the one day notice provision in snbRedion (hl applies to :;;ub;wction (h). By reading them togPthm·, Uw nmjority rewrites the ordinance so
that it provides that au owner has five days after receipt
of actual notice in which to reclaim his dog before it is surrendered for experimental purposes. 'l'his is done, we are
informed, ''for the purpose of avoiding any question of invalidity arisi71[J fnnn the lack of a specific notice r·equircment
in subscct?:on (h)." Using reasoning such as this, any statute
could be ''interpreted'' in such a way as to render it constitutional.
'l'he only notice provi::;ion applies to dogs about to be sold.
'fhere is no notice provision in the subsection providing for
surrender of such dogs for experimental purposes. The sale
of a dog and its surrender for exphimental purposes are
two entirely different things and there is no basis in logic
for the statement of the majority that these two subsections must be read together and that the notice provision of
the sale subsection applies to the surrender subsection. Subsection (b) deals specifically and exclusively with the sale
of impounded dogs; subsection (h) deals only with the surrender of unclaimed, impounded animals for experimental
purposes. The only provision of subsection (h) of section
53.11 which could possibly be construed as providing for any
notice is that which reads: ''In order to give the owners of
impounded animals time within which to reclaim the same,
no animal shall be surrendered for such uses until it has
been impounded for a period of at least five days.'' But
we are informed by the majority that subsection (b) which
provides that the owner of the animal, if known, shall be
notified within a period of one day, applies "regardless of
the proposed method of disposing of the animal." We are
told that this meanc;; "actual notice" but that "We need
not speculate as to the possible methods by which actual
notice may be given to a known owner, since we may assume
that the city will proceed in a manner sufficient to meet all
requirements of law.'' 't'he subsection provides that the Department of Animal Regulation "shall hold such animal for
a pe1·iocl of one (1) day after the 1'mpounding of such animal,
du.rinq which time the owner of said animal, if known, shall
be notified, after which t1'me said am:mal may be sold . . . . "
(Emphasis added.)
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The notice provision in subsection (b) which is to be read
into subsection (h) does not take into consideration the fact
that even if the name of the registered owner appears on the
license tag, that one day's mailed notice in the city of Los
Angeles is unreasonable and insufficient. It is pointed out
in the brief:;;, that dnc to the present condition of the mail
delivery service, it usually talces two days for ordinary mail
to reach its addressee who resides within the city limits. It
does not take into considrration the faet that the owner of
the dog may not have a telephone; that the owner of the
dog might be out of town. It does not take into consideration
the length of time it might take an employee of the particular
pound in question to ascertain, hom the Department of Animal Regulation, the full name, address, telephone number,
etc. of the owner of the dog. And, it should not be overlooked that the majority, in construing the notice required
to be actual notice received by the owner, has overlooked the
provision of the subsection which provides, by the use of
mandatory language, that the animal shall be held for one
day, during which time the owner shall be notified, and that
after that time, the animal may be sold after posting notice
of sale for two days. This section provides for a th1·ee day
period at the most before an impounded animal may be sold.
It should be noted, in this respect, that the posted notices
are to be placed at ( 1) the public pound; ( 2) the city hall;
( 3) the central poliee station. There are five public pounds
in J_,os Angeles. At which one is the notice to be posted?
I cannot understand how the one day provision in subsection (b) can possibly be construed to mean that the owner
of the dog must be given actual notice which must be reeeived and that he thereafter (subsection (h)) has five days
within which to reclaim his dog. However, by such reasoning, a majority of this court, has now placed the constitutional stamp of approvnl npon the ordinance. In my opinion
the notiee provision;:: are immfficient to afford dne process
of' law.
In judging what is due process of law, the sufficiency of
the notice must be determined in eaeh case from the particular
circumstanees of the ease in 1Hmd, respect being had to the
cause and object of the taking ( W1dzcn v. Board of Snpervison, 101 Cal. J5 !35 P. 358, 40 Am.St.Hep. 171; Imperial
Water Oo. v. Boarcl of Super?Fisors, Hi2 Cal. 14 !120 P. 780] ).
Wl1ile it is impossible to define with preeision "due process
of law" it means, broadly speaking, that before a man's
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property may be taken by the state, he must be given notice
of the proceedings which may terminate in the taking, and
be given an opportunity to be heard. It means further that
the notice shall be a real and reasonable one, and the hearing,
such as is ordinarily, or at least reasonably, given in similar
cases (Beck v. Ransome-Crummey Co., 42 Cal.App. 74 [184
P. 431]). Particularly applicable here is the statement found
in People v. Broad, 216 Cal. 1 [12 P.2d 941], where this
court said ''. . . the essential validity of the law was to be
tested not by what has been done under it, but what may by
its authority be done; and where a statute makes no provision
for hearing or notice, either actual or constructive, such
defect is not supplied by the vol~[ntary adoption by public
officers of rules covering the situation." In Roller v. Holly,
176 U.S. 398, 409 [20 S.Ct. 410, 44 L.Ed. 520], it was said
"That a man is entitled to some notice before he can be deprived of his liberty or property, is an axiom of the law
to which no citation of authority would give additional weight;
but upon the question of the length of such notice there is
a singular dearth of judicial decision. It is manifest that
the requirement of notice would be of no value whatever,
unless such notice were reasonable and adequate for the purpose (DaV1:dson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 [24 L.Ed. 616];
Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701-712 [4 S.Ct. 663,
28 L.Ed. 569])." In that case, it was held ( 413) tha.t "Without undertaking to determine what is a reasonable ·notice to
nonresidents, we are of opinion, under the circumstances of
this case, and considering the distance between the place of
service and the place of return, that five days was not a
reasonable notice, or due process of law. . . . '' The Roller
case was followed in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &;
.Tn~st Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 [70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865],
where it was said ''An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality 1:s notice reasonably calcttlated, under all the
circumstances, to apzJrise inter·ested parties of the pendency
of the action and a;fforcl them an opportunity to present their
obJections, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 [61 S.Ct. 339, 85
hE d. 278, ] 32 A.L.R. 1357] ; Gmnnis v. Orclean, 234 U.S.
:58;) 184 S.Ct. 779. G8 I1.Ed. 13631; Priest v. [,as Vegas,
~:l~ !l.S. (i04 I :!4 S.<'t. 44:~. Gl'\ T1.E!l. 7511; Rollet· v. Holly,
176 U.S. 398 [20 S.Ct. 410, 44 L.Ed. 520]. The notice must
he of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, Granm:s v. Ordean, supra, and it must afford a
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rf'asonahl0 time for those inteJ'f'ster! to make their appearance. . . . But when notice is a person's due, process which
is a mere gesture is not rlue proeess.'' And in Griffin v. Griffin,
327 U.S. 220, 228 [66 S.Ct. 556, 90 !J.Ed. 685], it was said
"It is plain in any case that a judgment in personam directing execution to issue against petitioner, and thus purporting
to cut off all available defenses, could not be rendered on any
theory of the State's power over him, without some form of
notice by personal or substituted service. Wuchter v. Pizzutti,
276 U.S. 13, 18-20 [48 S.Ct. 259, 72 L.Ed. 446]; Restatement
of Conflict of Law, § 75; and compare Milliken v. JJ:leyer, 311
U.S. 457 [61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278, 132 A.L.R. 1357]. Such
notice cannot be dispensed with even in the case of jttdgments
in rem with respect to property within the jurisdiction of the
court rendering the jttdgment. Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398,
409 [20 S.Ct. 410,44 L.Ed. 520]." (Emphasis added.)
If the dog is not wearing a license tag, the majority says
that ''its owner will not have any ground to complain of a
failure to receive notice, because the ordinance places upon
him the duty to make sure that the dog wears its license tag
at all times except when it is indoors or in an enclosed yard
or pen." Apparently we now forget about the one day notice,
actual and received, and the dog is held for the prescribed
(snbsection (h)) period of five days before being surrendered
to a hospital or institution for experimental purposes. Under
reasoning of the type indulged in by the majority, we can
read the ordinance as circumstances warrant. So now, no
notice being practicable, we just look to the five day provision. This period of time is unreasonable. It does not take
into consideration the fact that duly licensed dogs may lose
their tags after straying; that they may, and do, break their
eollars thereby losing their tags; that strangers may remove
either collar or tag; that dogs may escape from enclosed pens,
or get out of the houses of their owners (where they are not
required to vvear tags) and wander far afield. It does not take
into eonsideration the not-unusual cases of theft of valuable,
registered dogs. It does not take into eonsic1eration the size
of the city of Los Angeles with its five pounds, and four
private shelters, and 19 pounds and animal shelters in Los
Angeles County, or the fact that the owner of the dog might
be out of the city when his dog escapes from his home and
the person caring for it, or from a kennel where he has left
it to be cared for.
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The majority, in pla(~ing its approval upon this five day
p('J"iod, has failN1 to consider that when a dog is missing, the
owner aRs1!llWS, often eorrectly, that the clog will come home
the next day and therefore does nothing for a one day
period; that the dog may be a "wanderer" who has always
returned from his prior wanderings; and that dogs do not seek
the nearest pound, or shelter, upon running away. No con,;ideration is given to the obvious fact that the owner of the
dog may advertise for his lost pet, that he may for the first
few days of the dog's absence call at the pounds and shelters
with no success, only to have the clog picked up later when he
has started to advertise for its return. In my opinion, due proeess of law requires that the ordinance provide for some type
of notiee in eases where the dog is not wearing a license tag.
'rhat notice could be by newspaper advertisement, giving the
deseription of the dogs impounded, or by radio announeement,
or by posting descriptions in various places throughout the
city.
'l'he ordinanee here involved is, in my opinion, unconstitutional in that it constitutes a taking of property without due
process of law as the courts have defined that guarantee in
both the Constitution of the United States and of California.
I would therefore reverse the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied March
19, 195a. Carter, .T., was of the opinion that the petition
:;;honlr1 be granted.

